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Thou Shalt Not Publicly Display the Ten
Commandments: A Call for a Reevaluation




Over the last two decades, religious display lawsuits have been
inundating court dockets nationwide.' Current Establishment Clause
2
jurisprudence provides little, if any, clear guidance for lower courts in
analyzing whether or not these displays are unconstitutional. Depending
on the context, some courts permit them,
3 while others prohibit them;4
some use the Lemon test, 5 while others use the endorsement test;6 and
still others use a historical test.7 Even the United States Supreme Court
is deeply divided about drawing the establishment line between
permissible and impermissible government action that expresses or
affirms religious sentiments.8
American history is "replete with official references to the value and
invocation of Divine guidance," 9 as evidenced by our national motto, "In
* J.D. Candidate, The Dickinson School of Law of the Pennsylvania State
University, 2005; B.S., Liberty University, 2002. The author dedicates this comment to
her mother, Charmaine Hoo, her father, Charles Hoo, and her grandmother, Sybil Wong.
1. See The Hon. Avern L. Cohn, Ten Commandments, Other Displays & Mottos,
available at http://www.firstamendmentcenter.org/rel-liberty/publiclife/Index.aspx (last
modified July 14, 2004).
2. "Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or
prohibiting the free exercise thereof." U.S. CONST. amend. I.
3. See Freethought Soc'y v. Chester County, 334 F.3d 247 (3rd Cir. 2003).
4. See Glassroth v. Moore, 335 F.3d 1282 (1 1th Cir. 2003).
5. See Lemon v, Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602 (1971).
6. See Books v. City of Elkhart, 235 F.3d 292 (7th Cir. 2000).
7. See N.C. Civil Liberties Union v. Constangy, 947 F.2d 1145 (4th Cir. 1991).
8. See, e.g., Lee v. Weisman, 505 U.S. 577 (1992); County of Alleghany v. ACLU,
492 U.S. 573 (1989). These two decisions, involving graduation prayer and holiday
displays, engendered nine separate opinions reflecting several different positions.
9. Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668, 676-77 (1984).
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God We Trust," national holidays, such as Christmas and Thanksgiving,
and the mural of Moses with the Ten Commandments in the chambers of
the Supreme Court. Because religion is such a vital component of
American culture, the debate over the proper interpretation of the First
Amendment's Establishment Clause balanced with free exercise of
religion is likely to continue. Cases involving religious affirmations
often pit those who believe that official commemoration of America's
religious heritage is desirable, against those who view such actions as a
means of foisting religion into public life. 10  However, not every
acknowledgment of religion amounts to an establishment of religion. A
preliminary reading of the plain language of the First Amendment will
reveal that only the latter is prohibited by the text."
The intent of the First Amendment is not to completely expel
religious expression from public life, but is merely to prohibit
government from establishing a national religion.12 While government
may not impose religion on anyone through official symbols, it should
not be forced to renounce the religious heritage upon which America was
founded.
There is well-documented history in support of the conclusion that
"the Ten Commandments have an independent secular meaning in our
society [in that] they are regarded as a significant basis of American law
and the American polity .... Members of the Supreme Court have
recognized the influence of the Ten Commandments on the foundations
of the American legal system and on the development of secular legal
codes in the western world.' 4 Numerous American presidents have also
10. See William P. Marshall, "We Know It When We See It:" The Supreme Court
and Establishment, 59 S. CAL. L. REv. 495, 532-33 (1986).
11. "Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion ...." U.S.
CONST. amend. I.
12. See Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38, 99 (1985) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) ("The
evil to be aimed at ... appears to have been the establishment of a national church, and
perhaps the preference of one religious sect over another ...."); Michael M. Maddigan,
The Establishment Clause, Civil Religion, and the Public Church, 81 CAL. L. REv. 293,
306 (1993).
13. Freethought Soc'y v. Chester County, 334 F.3d 247, 267 (3rd Cir. 2003). See,
e.g., Bertera's Hopewell Foodland, Inc. v. Masters, 236 A.2d 197, 200-01 (Pa. 1967)
(noting that "this divine pronouncement became part of the Common Law inherited by
the thirteen American colonies and by the sovereign States of the American union");
Anderson v. Maddox, 65 So.2d 299, 301-02 (Fla. 1953) (Terrell, J., concurring specially)
("'Thou shalt not steal' and 'thou shalt not bear false witness' are just as new as they
were when Moses brought them down from the Mountain."); State v. Gamble Skogmo,
Inc., 144 N.W.2d. 749, 768 (N.D. 1966) ("Thus, for temporal purposes, murder is illegal.
And the fact that this agrees with the dictates of the Judaeo-Christian religions while it
may disagree with others does not invalidate the regulation. So too with the questions of
adultery and polygamy. [sic] The same could be said of theft, fraud, etc., because those
offenses were also proscribed in the Decalogue.") (internal citations omitted).
14. See, e.g., Stone v. Graham, 449 U.S. 39, 45 (1980) (Rehnquist, J. dissenting) ("It
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made reference to the Commandments as a foundational legal
document.1 5
The Supreme Court recently had the opportunity to consider this
thorny issue. The unveiling of Chief Justice Roy Moore's Ten
Commandment monument in Alabama induced a heated controversy.
16
The Supreme Court did not act on the opportunity, but rather refused to
tackle the problem.' Undoubtedly, this controversial issue will resurface
for review.
This comment explores the ineffectiveness of current Establishment
Clause jurisprudence and proposes an alternative method to determine
the constitutionality of official religious speech. Specifically, Part II of
this comment analyzes the evolution of Establishment Clause
jurisprudence of the United States Supreme Court and explores the
reasons that, in light of this jurisprudence, such a display was permitted
by the Third Circuit in Freethought Society v. Chester County,'" but
prohibited by the Eleventh Circuit in Glassroth v. Moore.'9 Part III
justifies the need for a new framework by discussing the incoherence of
current Establishment Clause jurisprudence, proposes an alternative
approach, and applies the proposed framework to Glassroth v. Moore.
II. Background
The Supreme Court has traditionally utilized three tests in
determining whether the government has violated the Establishment
Clause. The first test, introduced in Lemon v. Kurtzman,20 voids
legislative action for violating the Establishment Clause unless it meets
the following criteria: 1) it must contain a secular legislative purpose;
2) its principal or primary effect must be one that neither advances nor
is... undeniable.., that the Ten Commandments have had a significant impact on the
development of secular legal codes of the Western World."); McGowan v. Maryland, 366
U.S. 420, 462 (1961) (Frankfurter, J., concurring) ("Innumerable civil regulations enforce
conduct which harmonizes with religious canons. State prohibitions of murder, theft and
adultery reinforce commands of the decalogue.").
15. See, e.g., 6 JOHN ADAMS, THE WORKS OF JOHN ADAMS, SECOND PRESIDENT OF
THE UNITED STATES 9 (Boston, Charles C. Little and James Brown 1851) ("If 'THOU
SHALT NOT COVET' and 'THOU SHALT NOT STEAL' were not commandments of
Heaven, they must be made inviolable precepts in every society, before it can be civilized
or made free."); HARRY S. TRUMAN, ADDRESS BEFORE THE ATTORNEY GENERAL'S
CONFERENCE ON LAW ENFORCEMENT PROBLEMS (Feb. 15, 1950), reprinted in PUBLIC
PAPERS OF THE PRESIDENTS, 1950, at 157 (U.S. Government Printing Office 1965) ("The
fundamental basis of this Nation's laws was given to Moses on the Mount.").
16. See Glassroth v. Moore, 335 F.3d 1282 (1 1th Cir. 2003).
17. 335 F.3d 1282 (1 1th Cir. 2003), cert. denied, 124 S.Ct. 497 (Mem) (2003).
18. 334 F.3d at 251.
19. 335 F.3d at 1284.
20. 403 U.S. 602 (1971).
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inhibits religion; and 3) the statute must not foster excessive government
entanglement with religion.
2 1
In Lemon, Pennsylvania and Rhode Island statutes provided state
aid to church-related elementary and secondary schools for teaching non-
religious subjects.2 2 Under the three-part test, the Court declared both
statutes unconstitutional.23  Because the statutes were intended to
enhance the quality of secular education in parochial schools, the statutes
passed the first prong.24 The Court bypassed the second prong upon
arriving at its conclusion that the third prong was not satisfied because
the statutes would involve excessive entanglement between government
and religion.25
In Marsh v. Chambers,26 the Supreme Court, applying the historical
precedent test, held that prayers given by a state-funded chaplain before
the opening sessions of the Nebraska state legislature were
constitutional.2 ' For the first time, the Court completely ignored the
Lemon test and declared, "in light of the unambiguous and unbroken
history of more than 200 years, there can be no doubt that the practice of
opening legislative sessions with prayer has become part of the fabric of
our society. ' '28 The Court reasoned that the historical evidence revealed
the intent of the founders and that this was a tolerable acknowledgment
29of widely held beliefs among the people of this country.
One year after the Marsh decision, Justice O'Connor, in her
concurrence in Lynch v. Donnelly,30 introduced the endorsement test for
Establishment Clause jurisprudence.3' Under this test, government
practices must not have the effect of communicating a message of
government endorsement or disapproval religion. 32 When applying the
endorsement test, courts ask whether a reasonable observer would
perceive a government practice as "conveying a message of endorsement
of religion. 33  In defining the reasonable observer, Justice O'Connor
21. Id. at 612-13.
22. Id. at 606.
23. Id.
24. Id. at 613.
25. 403 U.S. at 613-14.
26. 463 U.S. 783 (1983).
27. Id. at 795.
28. Id. at 792.
29. See id. at 790-92.
30. 465 U.S. 668 (1984).
31. Id. at 688.
32. Id. at 692. Justice O'Connor states: "Endorsement sends a message to
nonadherants that they are outsiders, not full members of the political community, and an
accompanying message to adherents that they are insiders, favored members of the
political community. Disapproval sends the opposite message." Id. at 688.
33. Id.
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stated that this person is "deemed [to be] aware of the history and context
of the community and the forum in which the religious display
appears.
34
Justice O'Connor emphasized religious pluralism and the need for a
religiously diverse society to remain broadly inclusive.35 Under this test,
a state would be permitted to display a religious symbol if its larger
setting negates any endorsement of the religious content of that symbol,
even though the symbol retains its distinct religious meaning within the
setting.
36
A. Third Circuit Opinion: Freethought Society v. Chester County
In Freethought Society v. Chester County,37 the Third Circuit held
that a Ten Commandment display in the courthouse of Chester County,
Pennsylvania, when viewed in the context of history, did not violate the
Establishment Clause.38 The plaque at issue was donated to Chester
County in 1920 and was purchased exclusively with private funds. 39 At
the dedication ceremony, both the religious and secular significance of
the Ten Commandments were emphasized. 40 Aside from the dedication,
the fifty-inch tall and thirty-nine inch wide plaque4 has remained in
place and nothing has been done by the county to draw attention to,
celebrate, or even maintain it.
42
While acknowledging that the Lemon inquiry was "somewhat
murky, even in light of the recent religious display cases decided by the
Supreme Court," the Third Circuit concluded that it was bound to follow
either this test or the subsequent endorsement test because Lemon had
not been explicitly overruled.43 The court stated that Justice O'Connor's
endorsement test applies in religious display cases of this type."
Utilizing the endorsement test, the Court asked whether a reasonable
observer, aware of the history of the plaque, would view it as an
34. Capitol Square Review & Advisory Bd. v. Pinette, 515 U.S. 753, 780 (1995)
(O'Connor, J., concurring in part and concurring in judgment). The question is "what
viewers may fairly understand to be the purpose of the display." County of Allegheny v.
ACLU, 492 U.S. 573, 595 (1989).
35. See County of Allegheny v. ACLU, 492 U.S. at 635 (O'Connor, J., concurring in
part and concurring in judgment).
36. Id. at 633-35.
37. 334 F.3d 247 (3rd Cir. 2003).
38. Id. at 250.
39. Id. at 251.
40. Id.
41. Id. at 253.
42. 334 F.3d at 250.
43. Id. at 256.
44. Id. at 250.
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endorsement of religion by the county.45 The court reasoned that while
the Ten Commandments are undeniably religious, the context of an
otherwise religious display can render the message of the overall display
as one that does not endorse religion.46
The court found it highly significant that the county had taken no
apparent action to highlight or celebrate the plaque since it was erected
eighty years prior. As the approximate age of the plaque was readily
ascertainable, the court stated that the reasonable observer would
consider the county's decision to leave the plaque in place as motivated,
in significant part, by a desire to preserve a long-standing plaque.48 A
new display, the court noted, is more likely to be perceived as an
endorsement of religion, especially where there is nothing else in the
context of the display to mitigate the religious message.
49
B. Eleventh Circuit Opinion: Glassroth v. Moore
Though decided less than a month apart, Glassroth v. Moore5° and
Freethought Society v. Chester County,51 produced opposite outcomes.
The Third Circuit in Freethought speculated that a contemporary
decision to erect such a display would more likely appear to be motivated
by religion because it could not be motivated by historical preservation.52
It is on this basis the Eleventh Circuit sought to reconcile these differing
results.
In Glassroth, three attorneys practicing in Alabama sought to enjoin
Chief Justice Roy Moore of the Alabama Supreme Court from displaying
a monument engraved with the Ten Commandments in the rotunda of the
Alabama State Judicial Building. 53 The Ten Commandments are carved
in two tablets on the top of the monument.54 There are quotations from
various historical documents and secular authorities on the sides of the
monument. 55 No government funds were expended on the monument,
45. Id.
46. Id. at 263.
47. 334 F.3d at 265.
48. Id.
49. For example, while the frieze of the courtroom of the Unites States Supreme
Court displays an image of Moses carrying the Ten Commandments, this portrayal is
alongside depictions of other figures who have impacted modem law, such as John
Marshall and William Blackstone. Id.
50. 335 F.3d 1282 (11 th Cir. 2003).
51. 334 F.3d 247 (3rd Cir. 2003).
52. Id. at 265.
53. Glassroth v. Moore, 335 F.3d 1282, 1288 (1 1th Cir. 2003).
54. Id. at 1285.
55. Id. at 1286.
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and this fact was stated in the Chief Justice's unveiling speech.56
The Eleventh Circuit, in applying the "often maligned" 57 Lemon
test, concluded that the monument failed the first two prongs of Lemon's
three prong test.58 Chief Justice Moore's proclaimed purpose in placing
the monument in the Judicial Building was to acknowledge the law and
the sovereignty of the God of the Holy Scriptures. 59 The court, finding
this testimony significant in its secular purpose inquiry, disregarded
Chief Justice Moore's argument that the Ten Commandments have a
clear secular application as a fundamental legal code of Western
Civilization.60 The court likened his argument to the state's unsuccessful
contention in Stone v. Graham6 1 that the fine print about secular purpose
on the Ten Commandment posters gave them a constitutionally
62permissible purpose.
The monument also failed the effect prong of the Lemon test
because a reasonable observer would view the monument's primary
effect as an endorsement of religion.63 The court based this conclusion
on the appearance of the monument itself, its location and setting in the
rotunda, the selection and location of the quotations on its sides, and the
inclusion on its face of the sacred text of the Ten Commandments.64
Finally, the court analyzed the display under the Marsh historical
test.65 Marsh involved the practice of beginning legislative sessions with
prayer-a practice that has continued without interruption since the
earliest congressional sessions and has become a "part of the fabric of
our society., 66  Unlike legislative invocations, displaying religious
symbols in judicial buildings has not had an "unambiguous and unbroken
history., 67 Marsh is applicable only when the challenged practice has a
history that reaches back to the practices of the founders. Because Chief
Justice Moore pointed to no such evidence, the court concluded that this
56. Id. at 1287. "He did not use any government funds in creating or installing the
monument." Id. at 1285.
57. Id. at 1295. "No fewer than five of the currently sitting Justices have, in their
own opinions, personally driven pencils through the [Lemon test's] heart, and a sixth has
joined an opinion doing so." Lamb's Chapel v. Ctr. Moriches Union Free Sch. Dist., 508
U.S. 384, 398 (1993) (Scalia, J., concurring).
58. 335 F.3d at 1297.
59. See id. at 1296.
60. Id.
61. 449 U.S. 39 (1980) (holding unconstitutional the display of Ten Commandments
on school room wall for lack of sufficiently secular purpose).
62. Id. at 41. The Supreme Court stated that such an "avowed" secular purpose is
not sufficient to avoid conflict with the First Amendment. Id.
63. 335 F.3d at 1297.
64. Id.
65. Id. at 1297-98.
66. Id. at 1298.
67. Id.
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display was not justified under Marsh.68
III. Analysis
A. Flawed Establishment Clause Jurisprudence
1. The Lemon Test
The secular purpose requirement under Establishment Clause
jurisprudence has never been clearly defined.69 While it is evident that
government must have some legitimate,70 nonreligious justification for
its action, it is unclear whether or not these secular considerations must
reveal a predominant nonreligious purpose.
In Stone v. Graham,7' the state of Kentucky argued that instilling
moral values in society and illustrating the connection between the Ten
Commandments and our legal system were legitimate secular purposes
for posting the Ten Commandments. 72 The Supreme Court rejected this
argument and declared, "the pre-eminent purpose for posting the Ten
Commandments on schoolroom walls is plainly religious in nature.,
73
This display failed to meet the secular purpose requirement because it
was intrinsically religious. 74 If the distinctively religious character of a
particular activity shows a predominant religious purpose, then it follows
that any official message or display with basic religious meaning should
be found unconstitutional. For as "the Ten Commandments are
undeniably a sacred text in the Jewish and Christian faiths, 75 a nativity
scene, a chaplain's prayer, and swearing on the Bible have roots
stemming from the Christian faith.
In Lynch v. Donnelly,76 however, Chief Justice Burger, writing for
the majority, acknowledged that to "focus exclusively on the religious
component of any activity [will] inevitably lead to its invalidation under
the Establishment Clause., 77  He declared that the secular purpose
68. 335 F.3d at 1298.
69. Edwards v. Aguillard, 482 U.S. 578, 613-19 (Scalia, J. dissenting) (noting
Court's failure to adequately explain what "secular purpose" means).
70. Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 612 (1971).
71. 449 U.S. 39 (1980).
72. Id. at 40.
73. id. at 41.
74. Id.
75. E. Gregory Wallace, When Government Speaks Religiously, 21 FLA. ST. U. L.
REv. 1183, 1209(1994).
76. 465 U.S. 668 (1984) (holding that a city's use of a nativity scene in its Christmas
display did not violate the Establishment Clause).
77. Id. at 680.
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requirement is met so long as the activity is not "motivated wholly by
religious considerations."78 Under this reasoning, a challenged display
will survive First Amendment scrutiny so long as there is some
legitimate secular purpose, regardless of how minor. Therefore, even a
display such as Chief Justice Moore's monument might pass this prong
of the Lemon test. Lynch, however, was a five-to-four decision and
Justice O'Connor differed from the rest of the majority and maintained
that the secular purpose requirement "is not satisfied... by the mere
existence of some secular purpose, however dominated by religious
purposes. 79  The end result is that courts are now left with no
authoritative determination of what "secular purpose" means.
The effects prong is as indefinite as the secular purpose prong.
Under the effects test, government action cannot have a "primary effect"
of advancing religion. 80 The meaning of "primary" in this context is
ambiguous. It may be used comparatively to mean "principal,"
permitting a considerable religious side effect of the activity so long as
the predominant consequences are secular;8' or, "primary" may be used
substantively to mean an effect that is immediate, direct, and
consequential, and would thus permit the many forms of official
religious expression that have only incidental religious benefit.
82
The comparative approach was used in Lynch to determine whether
a nativity scene impermissibly advanced religion.83 The Supreme Court
held that the display was "[no] more beneficial to and [no] more an
endorsement of religion"8 4 than were other practices previously held
constitutional.8 5 Thus, if a court determines that a religious affirmation
or display does not exceed the level commonly accepted in the past, it
may be permitted. This reasoning missed the heart of the issue by failing
to explain the constitutionality of the practice. "Everything is relative to
what government has traditionally done. 86 This provides no hard and
fast rule for courts to follow or for judges to use in comparing dissimilar
practices.
The final prong, excessive entanglement, is no less analytically
problematic. The Court has neither defined what constitutes
entanglement nor specified the point at which entanglement becomes
78. Id.
79. Id. at 690-91 (O'Connor, J. concurring).
80. Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 612 (1971).
81. Wallace, supra note 61, at 1212.
82. Id.
83. 465 U.S 668 (1984).
84. Id. at 681.
85. Id. at 681-83.
86. Wallace, supra note 61, at 1213-14.
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"excessive. '87 Furthermore, the Court has never fully explained why an
excessive entanglement inquiry need even be included in an
Establishment Clause analysis.88
2. The Endorsement Test
While the endorsement test proposed by Justice O'Connor in her
concurring opinion in Lynch 89 is an improvement upon the test set forth
in Lemon, it has nonetheless been the subject of similar criticism. Justice
O'Connor's test correctly presumes that government conduct may
advance religion without necessarily endorsing it.90 She emphasizes
religious pluralism in permitting a state to display a religious symbol if
its larger setting negates any endorsement of the religious content of the
display, even though the display retains its inherently religious meaning
within the setting. 91
The problems arise with this test when one attempts to give
meaning to the term "endorsement." Justice O'Connor attempted to
draw a distinction between official "acknowledgment" of religion and
official "endorsement. 9 2  She classified practices such as legislative
invocations, official declaration of Thanksgiving as a public holiday,
placing "In God We Trust" on coins, and opening court sessions with
"God save the United States and the Honorable Court" as permissible
acknowledgments.93 These widely accepted usages, however, are not
merely objective acknowledgments of religion. These practices assume
the truthfulness of a fundamental premise of religious beliefs-that is,
the existence of a Supreme Being or deity.94
Moreover, by looking to a "reasonable" observer, this test
presupposes that there is a single and impartial perspective from which to
judge whether government has endorsed religion; however, as Gregory
Wallace surmises, "[i]t is simply impossible to define an objective or
87. Maddigan, supra note 12, at 300.
88. Id.
89. 465 U.S. at 692.
90. See id. at 634. "The relevant question for Establishment Clause purposes is
whether the [challenged government action] sends a message of government
endorsement... or whether it sends a message of pluralism and freedom to choose one's
own beliefs." Id.
91. See County of Allegheny v. ACLU, 492 U.S. 573, 633-35 (1989) (O'Connor, J.,
concurring in part and concurring in judgment) ("In my view, the relevant question for
Establishment Clause purposes is whether the city of Pittsburgh's display of the menorah,
the religious symbol of a religious holiday, next to a Christmas tree and a sign saluting
liberty sends a message of government endorsement of Judaism or whether it sends a
message of pluralism and freedom to choose one's own beliefs.").
92. See Lynch, 465 U.S. at 692-93 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
93. Id.
94. Wallace, supra note 61, at 1219.
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reasonable observer without imputing to that observer certain
characteristics that ultimately will affect his or her perceptions of
endorsement." 95 Indeed, the subjectivity this inquiry presents makes it
overwhelmingly likely that a finding of governmental endorsement of
religion will be a product of the varying perceptions and biases of judges.
Beyond the inability of courts to provide a workable definition for
the endorsement test, another source of concern for this concept arises
with the issue of standing. Individuals are permitted to challenge
government expression solely on the grounds that such action makes
them feel excluded, stigmatized, or offended.96 Because the purpose of
the endorsement test is "to protect the sensibilities of nonadherants,
establishment is formulated as a function of personal perceptions or
feelings rather than an abuse of government power., 97 The general rule
for Establishment Clause claims is that plaintiffs must identify a
"personal injury suffered by them as a consequence of the alleged
constitutional error, other than the psychological consequence
presumably produced by observation of conduct with which one
disagrees.98 However, the endorsement test carves out an exception to
this general rule by allowing merely insulted observers to assert a
constitutional violation. It "errs by leaping from real disabilities to felt
disabilities." 99
3. The Historical Test
The historical approach of Marsh fails to explain why the founding
fathers did not think legislative prayers offended the Establishment
Clause. 100  Without this explanation, Marsh sheds no light on the
Establishment Clause beyond issues expressly confronted by the
founders' 0 -- only if the founders addressed and allowed the practice, is
it constitutional. Therefore, it is difficult to apply this rationale to forms
of public religious expression, other than legislative prayers, that do not
have a history reaching back to the practices of the founding fathers.
B. Alternative Approaches
None of the above tests provides the coherence needed in an
95. Id. at 1220.
96. See, e.g., Glassroth v. Moore, 335 F.3d 1282, 1288 (11th Cir. 2003) ("The
monument offends each of [the plaintiffs] and makes them feel like 'outsiders."').
97. Wallace, supra note 61, at 1221.
98. Glassroth, 335 F.3d at 1292 (citing Valley Forge Christian Coll. v. Ams. United
for Sep. of Church & State, 454 U.S. 464, 485 (1982)).
99. Wallace, supra note 61, at 1222.
100. Id. at 1215.
101. Id.
PENN STATE LAW REVIEW
Establishment Clause analysis. The Court has resorted to manipulation
of the definitions of terms in the tests applied. 10 2 It has also refused to
consistently apply the tests when confronted with the undesirable results
that unavoidably follow from its attempt to encapsulate the values
enshrined in the Establishment Clause in a single formulaic abstraction
that can be applied neatly in every circumstance. 03 The particular test
applied is dependent upon the fact pattern and upon the presiding court's
interpretation of the Establishment Clause. 10 4  This practice does not
foster predictability.
Glassroth105 and Freethought Society' °6 present two opposite sides
of the spectrum: a display that the court has deemed acceptable, and one
that the court has not. How a display will be treated that is not quite so
prominent or obtrusive, falling within the vast gray area, remains
uncertain. One is unable to predict what test will be utilized and what
the outcome will be. The spectrum itself must be changed.
Under a guise of neutrality, some commentators urge that the
Establishment Clause be interpreted to require the elimination of all
official symbols supportive of religion.10 7 The argument is that any time
the state communicates religiously, it favors religion over irreligion and
thereby endorses a religious claim.l 8 The solution to religious strife is to
"banish public sponsorship of religious symbols from the public
square." 109
Under this view, the First Amendment's negative bar against an
establishment of religion created a secular state-a state favoring neither
theism nor atheism and encouraging neither belief nor disbelief.110 The
state is neutral, "while protecting all, it prefers none, and it disparages
none." III
102. Compare Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668, 680 (1984) (The inquiry is whether
the "statute or activity was motivated wholly by religious considerations."), with Bd. of
Educ. of Westside Cmty. Sch. v. Mergens, 496 U.S. 226, 249 (1990) ("What is relevant is
the legislative purpose of the statute, not the possibly religious motives of the legislators
who enacted the law.").
103. Maddigan, supra note 12, at 297.
104. Id.
105. 335 F.3d 1282 (11 th Cir. 2003).
106. 334 F.3d 247 (3rd Cir. 2003).
107. Kathleen M. Sullivan, Religion and Liberal Democracy, 59 U. CHI. L. REV. 195,
206 (1992) (arguing that the Establishment Clause mandates an "official agnosticism"
requiring a "standing gag order on government's own [religious] speech and
symbolism").
108. See id.
109. Id. at 207.
110. Seeid. at208.
111. School District v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203, 215 (1963). This neutrality principle
forms the basis of both the Lemon test and the endorsement test. Wallace, supra note 61,
at 1190.
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As a matter of history and Establishment Clause jurisprudence,
however, this argument is fatally flawed in several respects. The
assumption that government must remain "officially agnostic" to end
religious strife ignores the inevitable tendency of communities to divide
along religious lines." 12 Any serious effort to eliminate all distinctively
religious language and symbols from the public sphere would likely
provoke further polarization. This feat would include removing the
inscriptions containing religious language from the walls of the Lincoln
and Jefferson memorials, expunging from public school textbooks
religious affirmations in the Declaration of Independence, recalling and
reissuing our national currency without the words "In God We Trust,"
and firing publicly-funded chaplains who conduct legislative
invocations.'13
Furthermore, to ban all governmental religious speech is to privilege
a secular view of reality over a religious view and, consequently, to
render illusory any claim of neutrality. Considering how deeply such
forms of public religious expression are ingrained in our culture, their
removal could send an overwhelming message of open hostility toward
religion.
Pure secular speech conveys the idea that reality is encompassed
only by the temporal or the mundane and that the existence of a Supreme
Being is unknowable.' 14  This pits secular language in direct
contradiction with common religious tenets." 5  To allow the state to
express secular ideas, regardless of how they convey disapproval or
hostility toward religion, while contemporaneously prohibiting any
official expression that even marginally supports religion, cannot be
called neutral or unbiased."
16
A new approach is needed which focuses on the values behind the
inclusion of the Establishment Clause in the First Amendment." 7 The
beliefs that animate the Establishment Clause are best understood by
examining how the founding generation perceived official religious
speech and religious establishments. It is the drafter's assumptions about
reality, or "original intent," that should inform current interpretation of
112. Wallace, supra note 61, at 1193. This is precisely what James Madison
understood as an extraconstitutional guarantee of religious liberty. Id. According to
Madison, division among multiple religious sects reduces the likelihood of overbearing
majorities arising. Id.
113. See Wallace, supra note 61, at 1201.
114. Id. at 1194.
115. A subtle example is evidenced by the official silence in secular curriculum
materials about the religious influences on American history and culture. Id. at 1195.
116. Id. at 1199-1200.
117. Maddigan, supra note 12, at 303.
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the Religion Clauses. 118 To understand original intent the plain meaning
of the provision when it was inserted in the Constitution must be
determined." 9  The community in which the founders lived must be
examined to understand the founder's views on official recognition of
religion. 120
There is a modem tendency to believe that the Bill of Rights
functions as the embodiment of America's "aspiration[s] to social justice,
brotherhood, and human dignity." 121 In truth, the Bill of Rights was a
compromise to a bitter political conflict and served as a limitation on the
reach of the federal government. 22 The construction of the Religion
Clauses provides a prime example of this purpose of safeguarding
religious decision-making from undue state intrusion. 23  The
Establishment Clause forbids the state from imposing its religious
preferences, while the Free Exercise Clause forbids the state from
interfering with an individual's religious practices. 1
24
The founders, cognizant of the autonomous role of religion in the
public sphere, designed the Clause in part to protect this autonomy.
125
They understood that religion supplies citizens with a sense of moral
guidance and legitimacy not supplied by other institutions, 126 and that it
teaches people basic values of diligence, honesty, and the dignity of
mankind necessary to support a democratic government.
127
For the founders, disestablishment did not foreclose government
recognition of religion's unique contribution to public life or
acknowledgment of divine providence in national affairs. 128  What
disestablishment did mean was that the federal government could not pry
into private religious decisions. 129 This is evidenced by the limited effect
the enactment of federal and state prohibitions on religious
establishments had on the frequency with which government conveyed
118. Id. at 304. The use of "original intent" in this comment does not mean the
subjective motivations of the drafters. An approach based on such subjectivity will
necessarily fall prey to the criticisms of the Lemon and endorsement tests.
119. Id.
120. Id. at 305.
121. William J. Brennan, Jr., The Constitution of the United States: Contemporary
Ratification, 27 S. TEX. L. REV. 433, 433 (1986).
122. Maddigan, supra note 82, at 305 (describing the emergence of the Bill of Rights
out of the dispute between the Federalists and the Anti-Federalists over the true origin of
the U.S. Constitution).
123. See U.S. CONST. amend. I.
124. See id.
125. Maddigan, supra note 82, at 306.
126. Wallace, supra note 61, at 1245.
127. Maddigan, supra note 82, at 308.
128. Wallace, supra note 61, at 1245.
129. Id.
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religious ideas in its constitutions, laws, ceremonies, and symbols during
the founding periods. 130  Congress and state legislatures alike not only
regularly proclaimed official days of public fasting and prayer, but also
provided for chaplains to open their sessions with prayer and encouraged
the practice of religion in other official pronouncements.' 3 1 The
Declaration of Independence, most state constitutions, and other such
official documents contained abundant references to God and religion.
132
Presidential speeches and those of other public officials often contained
religious appeals.1 33 Indeed, the Establishment Clause limited neither the
role of religion in society nor the encouragement of religious values.
Instead, religion's interactions with the new federal government were
restricted1 34 so as to eliminate the potential of government coercion with
respect to religious preference.
Undoubtedly, Madison and those in the Continental Congress
understood how official prayers or other displays of religious expression
could be offensive to individual religious sensibilities.1 35 Nonetheless,
the founders approved such practices so long as no one was obligated to
believe a certain way or to participate in religious exercises.
136
As explained above, the Supreme Court has relied on a historical
analysis137 in deciding to uphold certain religious practices that might be
unconstitutional according to a strict application of the Lemon test.
138
While this historical method of relying simply on imperfect analogies
with past practices has produced inconsistent results and has shed no
light on the meaning of the Establishment Clause, it nevertheless seems
to acknowledge that the context in which this Clause was drafted should
guide its modern interpretation. 139 The Supreme Court's reliance on this
method suggests not only its recognition of religion's continuing
function in society, but also that an understanding of this function should
indeed guide Establishment Clause construction.
The Supreme Court's method of historical analysis would be
130. Id. at 1231-32.
131. See County of Allegheny v. ACLU, 492 U.S. 573, 671-72 (1989) (Kennedy, J.,
concurring in judgment in part and dissenting in part); Marsh v. Chambers, 463 U.S. 783,
786-92 (1983).
132. See Lee v. Weisman, 505 U.S. 577, 633 (1992) (Scalia, J., dissenting).
133. See County of Allegheny v. ACLU, 492 U.S. at 671 (Kennedy, J., concurring in
judgment in part and dissenting in part).
134. Maddigan, supra note 82, at 306.
135. Wallace, supra note 61, at 1254 (explaining Madison's belief that the non-
coercive, recommendatory nature of executive religious proclamations preserved the
voluntary features essential to his conception of religious liberty).
136. Id.
137. See supra notes 26-29.
138. See Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 612-13 (1971).
139. Maddigan, supra note 82, at 307.
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improved if the Court relied on the animating principle behind the
Clause, religious liberty, 40 rather than on a methodology by analogy.
14'
The question to be asked is "whether [the government religious speech]
is a means of imposing officially-preferred religious beliefs or
practices."'142  This occurs when government attempts to direct the
religious choices of its citizens through its rhetoric or symbols.
143
However, religious liberty must be tempered with an acknowledgment of
the role that religion, as an institution, plays in society. 144 The history of
the Religion Clauses dispels any notion that government is forbidden
from affirming, through language or symbol, the special status of religion
in public life.145 Government may speak religiously, but in expressing
itself, the government must avoid coercing compliance and using the
rhetoric of orthodoxy. 1
46
Official use of coercion, whether direct or indirect,147 in
advancement of the religious beliefs of the state is not to be tolerated.
The coercion limitation functions as a reasonable check on the influences
of the modem regulatory state upon the individual conscience.1
48
However, conscience is not coerced without being compelled to act in a
manner that affirms or denies religious belief.'49  Merely viewing a
religious display or hearing a nonparticipatory prayer in the public forum
is not an inherently religious act. 150  While some may respond in a
religious manner, this response is not required in order to observe or
listen.' 51 Individual conscience is generally not violated unless one is
asked to participate in the prayer or to pay homage to the display.
52
Where one is not required to do so, her real complaint is that the prayer is
being voiced or the symbol is being displayed, not that a conflict of
140. Although commonly accepted, this historical view is not unanimous. Justice
O'Connor, for example, believes that the Clauses should ensure equal standing in the
public sphere among adherents of different faiths. Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668,
687-88 (1984) (O'Connor, J., concurring).
141. Maddigan, supra note 82, at 307.
142. Wallace, supra note 61, at 1255.
143. Id.
144. Maddigan, supra note 82, at 307.
145. Wallace, supra note 61, at 1256.
146. Id. at 1257.
147. Coercion goes beyond the state's compelling persons by direct legal sanction to
conform to the religious message it conveys. Id. By making nonconformity difficult or
costly, or by requiring the forfeiture of some other right or privilege, official religious
expression may pose the threat of indirect coercion. Id.
148. Maddigan, supra note 82, at 335.
149. Wallace, supra note 61, at 1264.
150. Id.
151. Id.
152. Id. at 1263.
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conscience has been created.1 53 There is a crucial distinction between
harm that occurs when a person is forced to say or do what his religious
conscience will not allow, and "psychic" harm such as feeling offended
or alienated. 54  The former violates the coercion principle because it
signifies an espousal of religious practices, while the latter does not
because the action is based on mere exposure to offensive religious
messages. 155
The coercion test, independently applied, does not reach far enough.
Official religious messages may still have a harmful effect despite the
fact that they do not compel affirmation or participation.' 56 The potential
for such harm is best handled under the limiting principle of orthodoxy.
The orthodoxy principle recognizes that judging the truth or falsity of
religious beliefs is a determination that falls outside the scope of
governmental authority.1 57  Consequently, the state is barred from
attempting to indoctrinate or to persuade individuals that certain religious
views are more acceptable than or superior to others. Thus, generalized
references to God's position over the state and the religious nature of
American people are acceptable because they are consistent with a host
of different religious traditions and are not expressions of a particular
orthodoxy. 5 8 While they recognize the existence of a Supreme Being,
these statements are not imperatives telling people to believe in God or to
embrace one religious doctrine over another.'59
Underlying this principle is the understanding that the state may not
invade the process of private religious decision-making. 60  Religious
speech of government does not violate the Establishment Clause merely
because it is an affront to individual sensibilities, but rather because the
purpose or effect of government speech is to manipulate that process.
61
C. Proposed Approach Applied to Glassroth v. Moore
In applying this analytical framework to Glassroth v. Moore,'62 a
court should examine the historical context of the Ten Commandments
153. Id.
154. Id. at 1262.
155. Id.
156. Government might be allowed to engage in explicitly theologically religious
practices as long as those practices were not coercive. Maddigan, supra note 82, at 336.
157. Wallace, supra note 61, at 1267.
158. Id. at 1268.
159. Id. at 1268-69.
160. Id. at 1268.
161. Id. In this way, the orthodoxy principle is a refinement on the endorsement
concept, which allows an Establishment Clause claim to be brought on the basis of
offensiveness to the observer.
162. 335 F.3d 1282 (1lth Cir. 2003).
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display. Traditionally, the Ten Commandments have symbolized a
moral floor for acceptable behavior and have served as an antecedent to
obedience of the law.1 63 It is unnecessary for Chief Justice Moore to
deny the markedly religious heritage of the Decalogue because history
reveals that disestablishment does not foreclose official recognition of
the role of religion in civil society. Use of the Ten Commandments for
their moral and legal significance is not only permissible, but under this
approach, is also recognized as indispensable in encouraging principles
of good citizenship.
This approach eliminates the need to rely on ambiguous words, such
as "primary purpose" or "reasonable observer," or on relative factors,
such as the age of the display, or whether it has been maintained,1 64 that
are guaranteed to produce unpredictable and inconsistent results. It is of
no consequence whether the display was erected in the sixteenth century
or the nineteenth century; so long as the display is not a means of
government coercing religious choices in favor of one religion over
another, it will be constitutional. This approach correctly focuses a
court's attention on whether the display promotes a particular religious
view in a way that conveys a clear expectation to the nonadherant that he
or she accept the view.1 65 In this way, the inquiry is redirected to the
content and context of the message, and away from mere perceptions.
Chief Justice Moore's refusal to remove this monument parallels
James Madison's permitting the practice of official prayers, despite
awareness that some may be offended. 166  By viewing Chief Justice
Moore's display, none of the three attorneys bringing this suit were
forced to speak or act in a manner contrary to his individual conscience.
Observation alone does not translate into forced participation in or
affirmation of the underlying religious roots, 167 and thus, does not suffice
as coercion under this test.
While Chief Justice Moore's display passes the coercion test, the
analysis does not end here. The state, through symbols or rhetoric, may
not attempt to indoctrinate or to persuade individuals that certain
religious views are more acceptable than others.1 6' Although Chief
Justice Moore gave religious reasons for the monument, the display itself
is the object being challenged, not the Chief Justice's statements. The
163. See supra notes 13-15 and accompanying text.
164. See Glassroth, 335 F.3d at 1300 (using these factors to distinguish the Third
Circuit opinion).
165. The focus of the endorsement test is whether the display sends a message to
nonadherants that they are outsiders. See County of Allegheny v. ACLU, 492 U.S. 573,
633-34 (1989) (O'Connor, J., concurring in part and concurring in judgment).
166. See supra notes 135-36 and accompanying text.
167. See supra notes 120-26 and accompanying text.
168. See supra notes 156-57 and accompanying text.
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real question is whether the monument suggests a message of orthodoxy.
If the Ten Commandments were the only message featured on this
monument, this question could plausibly be answered in the affirmative;
however, this is not the case. In fact, the monument also featured a
significant number of historical items, including quotations from George
Mason, James Madison, and William Blackstone, as well as excerpts
from the Declaration of Independence, the Preamble to the Alabama
Constitution, and the National Anthem.1 69  The Third Circuit in
Freethought Society indicated that the placement of secular texts
alongside the Ten Commandments display justifies the United States
Supreme Court's mural of Moses carrying the Commandments. 7 ° If this
is an adequate basis for the display in America's highest court, it follows
that the same message is appropriate in a state court. The display of the
Ten Commandments was clearly supplemented by other secular displays
on the monument itself, thereby neutralizing a claim of proselytizing.
Alternatively, in analyzing whether the state is conveying a message
of orthodoxy through the monument, it is relevant that the display is
neither state-funded nor state-authorized. Chief Justice Moore made no
claim of acting on behalf of the state. On the contrary, in his unveiling
speech, Chief Justice Moore made a disclaimer of government
involvement in stating that no government funds had been expended on
the monument. Further, the Eleventh Circuit opinion reveals that
Chief Justice Moore acted "without the advance approval or even
knowledge of any of the other eight justices of the Alabama Supreme
Court.1 72 By donning the judicial robe, a judge does not shed the cloak
of personal rights, 73 nor does his conduct become automatically
attributable to the government by virtue of his position. Regardless of
whether one finds offense in Chief Justice Moore's apparent religious
motivations, the fact remains that Roy Moore, as a citizen of the United
States, is guaranteed a right to freely practice his own religion. If a court
determines that Chief Justice Moore acted outside the scope of his
government position in displaying this monument, this case would
necessarily fall outside the scope of the Establishment Clause analysis
because the Clause, by its terms, applies only to governmental actions.
74
169. Glassroth v. Moore, 229 F. Supp. 2d 1290, 1295 (2002).
170. 334 F.3d at 265.
171. Glassroth, 335 F.3d at 1287.
172. Id. at 1285.
173. See U.S. v. Bakker, 925 F.2d 728, 740 (4th Cir. 1991).
174. The test set forth by Justice Scalia in Capital Square Review and Advisory Board
v. Pinette, 515 U.S. 753 (1995), would then govern. The display would only be
permissible if, in fact, the government were not involved and other viewpoints could be
expressed in the same manner or place. See id. at 769-70.
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IV. Conclusion
The interrelation of religion and government is a topic that evokes
the passions and enthusiasms of the masses. The United States Supreme
Court will continue to be called upon to address the deficiencies of
current Establishment Clause jurisprudence with the influx of cases such
as Glassroth v. Moore.175 It should act with awareness that every public
display of the Commandments does not amount to an establishment of
religion as contemplated by the founders, while ensuring that the display
does not coerce compliance with a religious doctrine or convey a
message of particular orthodoxy. Furthermore, underlying all this should
be the remembrance that religion functions as an institution which
provides stability and moral guidance for the political community. Until
the Supreme Court chooses to act, 176 the image of Moses with Ten
Commandments in hand peering down to the seat of the Chief Justice,
will, no doubt, serve as a daily reminder that the issue is yet to be
resolved.
175. 335 F.3d 1282 (11 th Cir. 2003).
176. Since the writing of this comment, the Supreme Court has granted certiorari on
two cases involving the display of the Ten Commandments on public property. See
McCreary County v. ACLU, 354 F.3d 438 (6th Cir. 2003), cert. granted, 2004 WL
2059432 (Mem) (2004); Orden v. Perry, 351 F.3d 173 (5th Cir. 2003), cert. granted,
2004 WL 2282082 (Mem) (2004).
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